This supervised agent session used read-only MCP connections to the labs to produce an anonymous point-in-time candidate. Deterministic validation rejects candidates containing names, addresses, or identifiers; it never receives raw identifiers or removes them. The website never connects to the private lab.
// TRY IT
Try it: sanitize a config in your browser
Provided AS IS, without warranty of any kind. Best-effort: it does not guarantee removal of all sensitive or identifying information. Review the output before sharing it.
Processing is 100% client-side — nothing you paste leaves your browser.
Everything below is early. It works in our lab against real gear; we need it to work in yours. Stats refresh live from GitHub when you're online. Hover over or tab to a card and the repos it depends on, plus the ones built on it, light up with it.
Foundation
Core libraries that power the MCP server ecosystem. (3 repos)
The shared Rust foundation under mechub's per-vendor firewall mcp servers — bearer-token auth, scopes, attribution and audit, transport hardening, and change control, written once instead of once per vendor. Consumed as a git dependency, not on crates.io.
Async NETCONF client library for Rust — YANG code generation, vendor profiles, connection pooling, and a Terraform-like CLI for declarative network config.
A Rust replacement for Juniper PyEZ — async-first Junos device automation built on rustnetconf. Python wheels: Linux x86_64 only (other platforms build with maturin).
Enterprise MCP servers for vendor platforms, built on the mecmcp foundation. Maturity follows the mecmcp README: beta, alpha, or planned (not usable). (9 repos)
MCP server that lets AI agents operate Palo Alto PAN-OS firewalls — bearer-token device and tool scopes, a guarded candidate-config lifecycle with independent approval, and the same security posture as rustjunosmcp.
beta· PAN-OS automation with guarded configupdated jul 2026
Async mcp server for HPE Juniper Security Director Cloud — bounded read tools for discovery, and a prepare/approve/apply path for policy deployment instead of a direct deploy call.
alpha· Security Director Cloud policy automationupdated sep 2026
Async mcp server for the HPE Juniper Mist cloud — bearer-token auth, org- and site-scoped tools, bounded responses, and guarded WAN-edge change control.
Sovereign Security Data Fabric — a deliberately minimal security data platform where the mcp tool surface is the product, not an afterthought. Vendor syslog normalised through Vector into ClickHouse, self-hosted end to end, with swappable Python store classes (ClickHouse by default). Reference deployment; no quick start.
Agent skills for firewall work — parsing, auditing, and converting configs across Cisco, Fortinet, Palo Alto, and Juniper. Works with Claude Code, Codex, and Hermes so far.
Browser-based conversion of firewall and cloud configs — PAN-OS, FortiGate, Cisco ASA/FTD, Check Point, SonicWall, Huawei USG, AWS/Azure/GCP, and more — into reviewable Juniper SRX output, with an LLM-guided greenfield mode. Always a migration draft requiring review — never production-ready.
Multi-vendor config migration to SRXupdated jul 2026
Strips private data — addresses, hostnames, secrets — out of a firewall configuration so it can be shared for help or review. Review the output before sharing — validation warnings flag items it may have missed.
Pushes one SRX's config — policies, objects, NAT — out to a fleet of others, so a golden device can drive the rest. It does not follow the "a human approves" model: there is no approval step, so run check and --dry-run first; pushes use commit confirmed.
Tool-call benchmark corpus and runner for network-automation agents — drives scenarios through local models and scores emitted tool-call sequences. Needs a local OpenAI-compatible endpoint (e.g. Ollama).
Proof ahead of claims. Here is exactly what these tools are today — and what they are not yet.
Built against real gear.
Everything public here is developed and used in one real lab: a Proxmox cluster running a 24-device Juniper vSRX topology, exercised through real NETCONF sessions, real commits, and real multi-vendor configs.
Not yet battle-tested elsewhere.
No mechub tool has been proven at someone else's site. That is precisely the help we are asking for — see below.
Interfaces may change.
Until a 1.0, expect breaking changes; they'll be called out in release notes, not hidden.
The AI boundary is fixed.
Deterministic code decides, models explain, a human approves. That rule does not change as the tools mature.
Tested with
Server
Device or software
Basis
Junos MCP
vSRX 26.2R1.7
lab
UniFi MCP
UniFi Network Application ≥ 10.5.67, UniFi OS Server ≥ 5.1.37
minimum supported
Other servers: see each repo's README.
04 · ROADMAP TRACKER
Where it's going
These are goals in active development — not promises. Scope and timing may change; when something ships, it ships on GitHub first and gets announced here.
A composable SecOps console: engineers and agents assemble boards over governed MCP data — zone matrices, rule analysis, feed history — and humans act through cross-platform change sets that honour each server's lab-mode or two-person approval. In development and not yet public.
05 · LAB TESTERS CALL
We need testers more than anything
The single most valuable thing you can do is run a tool against your own gear and tell us what happened — especially when the answer is "it broke".
An 80s boom box in the browser that plays internet radio through a Yamaha receiver over AirPlay — two zones, capped volume, and it never hijacks the TV.